This work revisits the centenary controversy between Eugen Ehrlich and Hans Kelsen on the scientific study of law, based on the analysis of the original texts published in the Archive for social science and social welfare (1915)(1916)(1917). The analysis of Kelsen's critical reaction to Ehrlich's project shows that the trajectory of sociology of law in the history of legal thought has been marked from the beginning by the clash with legal dogmatics.
In order to analyze Kelsen's critical reaction to Ehrlich's scientific project, the original texts of the debate published in the Archive for social science and social welfare between 1915 and 1917 were used as primary sources of information. These texts, so far available in compilations in German (LÜDERSSEN, 2003) and Italian (CARRINO, 1992) , were translated into Portuguese prior to the preparation of this article. This translation of the Ehrlich-Kelsen controversy is published in the present issue of Direito e Praxis.
The lack of effective engagement with these primary sources consists in one of the most remarkable deficiencies of the literature on the Ehrlich-Kelsen debate available in Brazil -for instance, Maliska (2001) , Sparemberger (2003) , Ataíde Junior (2010), Carlotti (2015) . Amato (2015) is an exception, in spite of the fact that the author seeks to develop a Luhmannian reading of this debate, which is fairly different from the one that is developed here. This situation results in a certain misunderstanding of the positions in dispute and even of the core of the controversy. However, there are a few studies published during the last decade -notably the works of Van Klink (2009) 11 and Maliska (2015) 12 -that revisited the debate using the texts of the Archive for social science and social welfare. These studies served as secondary sources of information.
The article is divided into four sections. Initially, the controversy is historically situated in order to highlight that the call for the development of sociology of law arose in a specific context of time and space, in which legal dogmatics already prevailed as a paradigm in the science of law. In the next section, the aim is to present Ehrlich's project of laying the foundations of a sociological science of the legal phenomenon, in opposition to legal dogmatics. Kelsen's critique is analyzed afterwards with the purpose of highlighting the divergences between the two perspectives on the way that they understand the relationships between legal dogmatics and sociology of law. Finally, the 11 Van Klinks's work integrates the volume Living law: reconsidering Eugen Ehrlich (HERTOGH, 2009) , which significantly contributed to shed new light on Ehrlich's thought. 12 Maliska's book (2001) is a fundamental reference in the study of Ehrlich's work in Brazil. In the second edition of the book, reviewed and expanded, a new chapter commenting on the Ehrlich-Kelsen debate was introduced (MALISKA, 2015, p. 35-52) .
last section discusses Ehrlich's response to Kelsen's critique in order to show that this controversy is an inaugural moment of an unfinished dispute between two paradigms.
Legal dogmatics as a paradigm in crisis in the context of the Austro-Hungarian Empire
The appearance of Fundamental principles of the sociology of law occurred in a historical moment in which a paradigm in the science of law had already been established in continental Europe. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire, however, the paradigm of legal dogmatics was going through one of its first crisis. In this section, the concept of paradigm is examined in the context of the theory of scientific paradigms; then, the main constitutive elements of legal dogmatics as a paradigm are identified in order to explain the conditions that disturbed its normal reproduction in the law schools of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the early 20 th century.
According to the theory of scientific paradigms (KUHN, 1970) , scientific fields are social constructions, because the consideration of knowledge as scientific depends on the existence of paradigms. A scientific paradigm is defined as "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" (KUHN, 1970, p. 175) . In order to understand the elements that conform a paradigm it is necessary to scrutinize the constellation of group commitments of a given scientific community, which is defined as a group of scientists who are practitioners of the same specialty, passed through a similar professionalization process and share an intersubjective agreement about the normal mode of producing scientific knowledge in their field (KUHN, 1970, p. 177-178) .
A paradigm thus consists in a relatively stable structure that conditions the practice of a group of scientists at a given historical moment. This means that crises and paradigm shifts can occur over time. According to the theory of paradigms (KUHN, 1970) , this typically happens when a few members of a scientific community realize that the dominant paradigm ceased to function properly. Dissatisfied with the available answers to address research questions of crucial practical importance, they start to search for solutions beyond the boundaries of normal science. This process leads to the development of news schools of thought that compete with each other for support of This theoretical framework suggests that paradigms may exist in many different scientific fields, shaping the way scientific knowledge is produced and consumed. There is indeed a whole literature in sociolegal studies that, based on this theory, argues that legal dogmatics consisted in the prevailing paradigm in the science of law throughout the 20 th century (ZULETA PUCEIRO, 1981; FARIA, 1988; HAGEN, 1995; ANDRADE, 2003) .
These analyses suggest that a scientific community focused on the study of law was structured historically, sharing a constellation of commitments that establishes who belongs to the group of scientists and what it means to do science of law in the normal way.
Legal monism is one of the constitutive elements of that constellation of commitments. The law as an object of study is reduced to the legal norms originated from legislative, judicial and administrative decisions of the state. Another belief is that the jurists' scientific task is to describe valid norms in a given space and time. The science of law must build a formal system of legal norms characterized by its logical unity and internal coherence, which requires the elaboration of a set of doctrinal concepts to systematize normative materials. Doctrinal studies of law, which provide a description of what the legal order prescribes about a particular matter, are the quintessential product of research done in accordance with the paradigm of legal dogmatics. The science of law works by serving the practical purpose of establishing the terms for future decision-making in concrete cases of judicial or administrative application of law, promising legal certainty and predictability in dispute resolution (ANDRADE, 2003) . status to the study of law, establishing as the task of the science of law to describe the content of a given system of positive law (SANDSTRÖM, 2005, p. 137) . The School of Historical Law is closely associated to the rise of the legal scholar, that is, the law professor who, acting with a certain independence in relation to the political powers, began to play a prominent role in the production and dissemination of the science of law, contributing to the rationalization of the professional work of practical jurists (FERRAZ JR., 1980, p. 54-55) .
The book Fundamental principles of the sociology of law consists in one of the first significant reactions to legal dogmatics as a paradigm. It is a book that develops not only a strong criticism of the science of law existing at the beginning of the 20 th century, but also proposes a new constellation of commitments: the sociology of law, a science of law that would be an integral part of sociology. In the widely known foreword in which he synthesizes the meaning of sociology of law, Ehrlich makes clear his project to shift to the center of the concerns of the jurists of his time what had become peripheral:
"at the present as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself" (EHRLICH, 2002, p. lvix; EHRLICH, 1986, p. 8) . The scientific project inaugurated by
Ehrlich involves the sociological understanding of law in social reality.
The Pure theory of law, in spite of all its originality, is a work that was inserted in the tradition of the paradigm of legal dogmatics. According to its author, "the Pure Theory is not, after all, so extraordinarily novel, contradicting everything that preceded it. It can be understood as a further development of approaches that emerge in the positivist legal science of the 19 th century" (KELSEN, 1992, p. 2; 1976, 8) . It is a scientific project that seeks to purify legal knowledge of all non-legal elements, that is, "the Pure Theory aims to free legal science from all foreign elements" (KELSEN, 1992, p. 7; 1976, 17) . Kelsen seeks to strengthen a project concerning the foundations of a science whose role lies in describing and systematizing the norms of the legal order. With the School of Historical Law, the typical characteristics of the paradigm of legal dogmatics were defined. However, this same paradigm was reconfigured in the 20 th century thanks to the contributions of the School of Legal Positivism (ANDRADE, 2003, p. 28) . This school, based on Kelsen's original contribution, formulated a theory of the legal order (BOBBIO, 1995, p. 197-198 (1914 -1918) , which is the final landmark of the historical period called "The age of empire" (HOBSBAWM, 2015) . Joseph's liberal, tolerant and modernizing policies encouraged the expansion of the university system, seen as an instrument for unity preservation and a strategy of common acculturation, whether through German language teaching or the promotion of scientific education (EPPINGER, 2009, p. 25-30) . It was in this context that universities . Written in exile, Pure Theory of Law (KELSEN, 1934) , his most influential work, develops ideas that already appear, to a considerable extent, in the debate with Ehrlich.
In order to better understand Kelsen's critique of Fundamental principles of the sociology of law, it is necessary to discuss Ehrlich's scientific project.
Ehrlich's scientific project: sociology of law against legal dogmatics
The first chapter of Fundamental principles of the sociology of law (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 9-26) can be understood as an eloquent attack on what is conventionally known as legal dogmatics. Ehrlich refers precisely to the science of law that prevailed in continental
European universities of the early 20 th century. Jurists' scientific task was to interpret and describe in a systematic way the existing positive law, that is, the legislation of their own states. He even asserts that the doctrinal studies of law resulting from this juristic science were merely a more elaborated form of publishing the laws of a country (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 21 ).
According to Ehrlich, juristic science consisted in exclusively practical knowledge. Lawyers acquired the skills necessary for the exercise of their profession, without being able to understand the scientific basis of the study of law. Rather than considering the needs of the different legal professions, teaching at law schools was almost exclusively oriented to the training of students in the performance of the duties of a judge or government official (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 12-13) . Indeed, discussions on legal matters revolved around dispute resolution before courts or bureaucratic agencies of the state. The training of the legal professional consisted in knowing the legal precepts in an abstract way and learning to apply them to the specific cases.
This juristic science was intended to constitute a system of rules of state origin according to which decisions should be made by judges and government officials. Within the legal system there would be answers for every practical question that might arise.
Norms for decision would be derived from the legal system, that is, instructions on how to decide legal disputes formulated in the most general terms possible. From the point of view of those who held positions of authority, such norms for decisions contained propositions applicable to the resolution of disputes before courts or administrative agencies (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 21-22) .
At the moment jurists started to share these postulates, states Ehrlich, they abdicated to study the law not created by the state. In spite of its heterogeneity, nonstate law was reduced to the idea of a customary law. To the juristic science there was no other law to be considered as a legitimate object of research than positive state law, exclusively that which courts and administrative agencies applied as law in the administration of justice, supported by the possibility of using coercion to enforce their decisions. It was possible to arrive at his stage because the state historically has claimed not only the monopoly on the administration of justice and on the legitimated use of physical coercion, but also on the creation of law (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 17) . The final step was taken when judges were no longer required to know non-state law and parties were asked to prove the existence of customs as a factual matter (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 18 ).
This was a backward and unsatisfactory state of affairs, Ehrlich argues. The science of jurists was fragile in its foundations, especially when compared to the progress achieved in other areas of the human knowledge, in which the distinction between practical knowledge and scientific knowledge had already been consolidated (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 9-11) . Research, literature and teaching within the science of law deviated from the standards of the other sciences. There were also no scientific methods, since the juristic science only knew the abstract and deductive method developed for the application of law by state authorities (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 14) . In short, for Ehrlich, legal dogmatics was as a kind of practical and professional knowledge. As such, it cannot be called science under any circumstances.
Ehrlich deepens this first narrative on the shortcomings of legal dogmatics in the following chapters of Fundamental principles of the sociology of law and then proceeds to a second narrative about the need for a sociology of law. Ehrlich strongly believed that the adequate development of a sociological science of law was an alternative to overcoming the state of affairs that characterized the science of law of his time. He advocated a science aimed at understanding how law works in in social life, which could put aside judgments about the immediate practical utility of scientific knowledge (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 9) , such as its instrumental use in the decision-making process by judges and government officials.
Sociology of law's subject matter was related to what Ehrlich called "living law". (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 384) . In this conception, the law would be equal to the legal norms of conduct, that is, the rules that people actually follow in the everyday life.
According to Ehrlich, many social relationships are determined by rules of conduct recognized as binding by members of social associations and incorporated into daily actions. In order to study the living law, it was necessary to investigate the inner order If traces of the organized human communities were followed, thought Ehrlich, law would be found everywhere, constituting and ordering the social associations that form the backbone of society: families, urban neighborhood, religious communities, farmers' cooperative societies, and so on. Law would consist first and foremost of an order, a form of social organization, which indicates to every member of a social association its position in the community and its duties. Law, thus, exists before its enactment by the state. It is on the basis of the practices that are at the heart of everyday social life, that is, the "facts of law" (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 68) , that the rules of positive law will be written (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 151 Being law a social phenomenon, the science of law in the proper sense of the expression is part of the social science, that is, sociology, which at that moment appeared with all its force seeking an understanding of social phenomena such as economy, religion, culture and politics. As the two final chapters of Fundamental principles of the sociology of law suggest (EHRLICH, 1986, p. 361-388) , such a science could employ an infinite variety of empirical methods of research to study the living law.
The sociology of law, therefore, would be the true science of law. For Ehrlich, the sociology of law contains all the possibility of a truly scientific knowledge about the legal phenomenon. Kelsen, as it will be seen, would never accept such a conclusion.
Kelsen's critical reaction: in defense of the division of scientific labor
In the beginning of A foundation of sociology of law it is already possible to realize that, at the heart of Kelsen's concerns, is the clash between the dogmatic and sociological approaches to law. Surely, he shared a certain dose of distrust regarding the dominant science of law in his time. He recognized the remarkable intellectual leadership of Ehrlich, who emerged as a scholar who has been proved capable of garnering support for a proposal to reform the science of law of his time:
When one of the leaders and founders of the so-called "sociological" science of law, which is new and increasingly stronger, presents to public opinion a great work whose title announces the foundation of this new science, there are reasons to address such a curious initiative with high expectations and great hope. Until then, all the numerous attempts to reform the science of law, many of which making passionate attacks on non-scientific and retrograde jurisprudence under the flag of "sociology," have failed.
[...] And if one among all could be able to present these foundations, this would surely be Eugen Ehrlich. His seductive and captivating writings, in his spirited and lively rhetoric, have attracted a faithful group of followers for more than two decades, indicating the path to be followed in this struggle for the science of law (KELSEN, 1915, p. 839 The fundamental opposition, which threatens to divide jurisprudence with regard to its object and method into two fundamentally different directions, results from the twofold approach to which it is possible to subject the legal phenomenon. One can consider the law as norm, that is, as a determinate form of ought, as a specific rule of ought, and accordingly constitute jurisprudence as a normative and deductive science of value, such as ethics or logic. But it could also be understood as part of social reality, as a fact or a process, whose regularity is explained causally, by inductive means. Law is here a science of the is of a certain human behavior, the science of law is a science of reality that works according to the model of the natural sciences. (Kelsen, 1915, pp. 841-842, our translation) .
Sociology studies the facts of social life, while the science of law deals with the study of norms, each accomplishing a distinct scientific task, both legitimate. The position advocated by Kelsen, therefore, implies that a clear line of demarcation between sociology of law and legal dogmatics should be traced. This is the focus of his critique of Ehrlich's project, which focuses on five points: confusion between "is" and "ought", the conceptual terminology, definition of the disciplinary boundaries, pluralist conception of law, and identification between law and society. 
The confusion between "is" and "ought"
Having clarified how he believes the division of labor between the traditional science of law and the emerging sociology should be established, Kelsen summarizes his epistemological critique: "It is completely inadmissible to confuse the problem of both directions, a syncretism of the methods of normative jurisprudence and explanatory sociology of law" (KELSEN, 1915, pp. 840-841, our translation). In his view, "It must be seen as a serious failure of Ehrlich's work that his foundation of sociology of law, already in its beginning, fails to present a clear separation between considerations of value and considerations of reality" (Kelsen, 1915, p. 842, our translation) . The difference between the "is" and the "ought" should be respected in the separation between the sociology of law and the traditional science of law.
The sociology of law lacks the necessary tools to define under which ontological conditions a group of people enjoys or not a legal order, says Kelsen. This is because the concept of law is reduced to the existence of a set of norms that are effectively followed in a given social group. Describing factual regularities and postulating the existence of norms were incompatible tasks within the realm of a same science and would certainly result in an objectionable confusion of facts and norms, between the "is" and the "ought". and norms has proven to be not only devastating to the future of sociology of the law, but also enormously appealing to the legal community, and would later become the cornerstone of his Pure Theory of Law.
The conceptual terminology
Kelsen explicitly claims in the sequence that there was a lack of a rigorous conceptual system in Fundamental principles of the sociology of law. In his view, in spite of the book's great conceptual novelties, the terminology adopted throughout the book was too arbitrary and distant from the terminology that is normally used in general theory of law. According to him, Ehrlich's concepts were obscure and oscillating, and in order to justify his criticism he begins to look more closely at the content of categories like legal propositions, legal norms, norms for decisions and facts of law.
For Kelsen, Ehrlich's distinction between legal propositions and legal norms did not make sense, since both are universally binding normative prescriptions, that is, valid rules for every member of a given group that externally condition individual free will.
Pointing to what he considers to be a logic flaw in Ehrlich's thought, he rejects the existence of an essential difference between legal norms and legal propositions, based on the fact that the latter are inscribed in a code of law or other formal legal text. The historical argument, grounded on the fact that the emergence of written law occurred only in societies that were already in an advanced stage of development, was unable to change the matter, since the legal propositions remain logically equivalent to norms as imperatives of conduct. A similar treatment is given to the concept of norms for decision. Relegating the subject to a footnote, Kelsen denies the theoretical utility of this concept, because it would imply a confusion between the way courts and administrative bodies act in reality and the way in which they should act.
Finally, Kelsen accuses Ehrlich of a lack of clarity concerning the facts of law.
He suggests that customary social practices, the facts that are regularly repeated, are included in such a problematic concept. Kelsen agrees that regular social practices may eventually turn into representations of ought-to-do for a given social group that keeps practicing them regularly, but strongly disagrees with Ehrlich's distinction between social practices and customary law. According to Kelsen customs are not routine behaviors that follow norms, but regular behaviors in themselves. Thus, Kelsen tries to invalidate Ehrlich's argument by claiming that they are "is", not "ought".
For Kelsen, therefore, Ehrlich's conceptual terminology was an unfolding of the epistemological problems that characterized his sociology of law, which disdained the logical distinction between facts and norms, the "is" and the "ought".
The definition of disciplinary boundaries
Kelsen adds that Ehrlich's epistemological and terminological difficulties are directly related to the definition of the boundaries of sociology of law with regard to its object and scope. Here lies the most important aspect of the third part of his critique, the questioning of the definition of the disciplinary boundaries of sociology of law in relation to other sciences that also deal with social phenomena that are to some extent similar to law, such as morality, art or religion.
Quoting several passages from his antagonist's book, Kelsen comments with some perplexity that, while Ehrlich recognizes the problem of tracing the boundaries that separate sociology of law from the other social sciences, he offers a clearly unsatisfactory answer to the problem:
Ehrlich can hardly be taken seriously when he says that: "The legal norm regulates a matter which, at least in the opinion of the group within which it has its origin, is of great importance, of basic significance... Only matters of lesser significance are left to other social norms." [...] Do moral and religious norms really address matters of lesser importance than norms on loans or leases? (KELSEN, 1915, p. 862, our translation) According to Kelsen's interpretation, the theoretical problem lies in the manifest fragility of the criteria for distinguishing between different types of norms envisaged by
Ehrlich, who seems to imply that such criteria is related to the feelings evoked by the breach of these norms. For Kelsen, this was a curious and fruitless attempt to specify the uniqueness of law by turning to social psychology.
The pluralist conception of law
In another moment of the critical review, the relationship between law and the State is discussed. Ehrlich struggles throughout his book to separate law as a social phenomenon from the state as kind of social association, an idea that Kelsen found disturbing. According to him, not only the terminology used by Ehrlich to discuss state law was arbitrary and misleading, but also the supposition that the state produces law.
The state, for Kelsen, is a form of social unity, which represents the supreme legal community and is regarded as a unitary order prevailing over the others:
If the higher community, which encloses all subgroups, must really be a social unity, that is, should be thought of as unity, then it is necessary to consider the subgroups to be subordinated to the higher social group. It is necessary to represent the legal orders of these partial social groups, which from each other in their singularity, as valid and differentiable only within the limits given by the organization of the higher community that encloses them in a unity. A construction that differs from this normative construction of a social unity, however, is not possible. In this conceptual construction -in which only the ideal unity of social groups occurs -the subgroups become organs of the higher community. The legal orders of each subgroup -legal orders that, considering their local and material boundaries, are always different one from another -constitute together with the organization of the higher community, a unitary system of norms, that is, a unitary legal order. This latter community, which is built above the singular groups, is the State as a legal community (KELSEN, 1915, p. 866-867, our translation) . If the State is thought as divided into a series of smaller legal communities with their own legal systems different one from the other, and their own legal institutions (courts) independent one from another, which is then the element that binds all these groups together and makes of all these singular groups one single State? A common legal order must exist, a legal order that functions as a barrier against the legal orders of the singular groups! If this order is not a legal one, then where would the state boundaries be? (KELSEN, 1915, p. 869 , our translation).
For Kelsen, legal norms are related to the State. Every unitary State is a different legal order. Kelsen's monistic theory of law implies that any legal relationship rests ultimately bound to the authority of the State, but only in a potential way. The violation of a legal obligation should result, as a possible consequence, in a reaction of the State, which serves as a barrier against the legal systems of singular groups. Kelsen's critique, in this fourth part of the text, ends with the questioning of the perspective which decades later was named legal pluralism.
The identification between law and society
Finally, the fifth part of A foundation of sociology of law criticizes the methodological aspects of Ehrlich's work. According to Ehrlich, the sociology of law should be entrusted with the task of observing the empirical facts concerning the legal phenomenon and explaining them theoretically in order to understand how law works in society.
For Kelsen, this identification between law and society was unacceptable. He suggests that a science of law with such pretensions would lose its specificity and cross the threshold between law and the social sciences.
Ehrlich simply identifies law and society, that is, he defines as law not only the form, but also the content of social phenomena, when he requires the science of law to present information about the regular political and economic relationships that are the substantive content of legal forms. [...] It is absolutely unprecedented such complete confusion of the boundaries between law and economy, between law and society, as well as between the science of law and all other social sciences! (KELSEN, 1915, p. 872-873, our translation) The possible scope of sociology of law as a science that differs from other social sciences such as economics, history, and psychology would be to deal with problems involving the genesis -the social origins -and the effectiveness -the social effects -of legal norms. For Kelsen, this sociology of law is not a completely autonomous science, but a fragment of the sociological science that explains social life.
The sociology of law, in particular, depends on the possibility of theorizing not only legal norms, but also other social norms. After all, "the effective behavior of human beings [...] is not, in fact, motivated only by legal norms, but also by norms of another kind (Kelsen, 1915, 875, our translation) . Since a sociological definition of the concept of law is not possible, in order to clearly delimitate the object of study of sociology of law it is necessary to adopt a normative concept derived from the science of law, whose point of view is distinct from that inherent to the explanatory knowledge sought by sociology.
Kelsen concludes his critique arguing that "Ehrlich's attempt to lay the foundations for sociology of law must be regarded as a complete failure: above all, due to lack of a clear definition of the problem and an adequate method" (KELSEN 1915, p. 876, our translation). For Kelsen, the coexistence of science of law with sociology was only possible on the basis of a compromise founded on the division of scientific labor. In this rigid scheme of separation between a science of the "is" and a science of the "ought", sociology of law would retain an external and subaltern position towards the science of law considering that even the definition of its object of inquiry required the concept of law provided by legal dogmatics. Ehrlich's Reply begins by approaching the issue of the supposed confusion between the "is" and the "ought" pointed out by Kelsen: To expect that someone might confuse an "ought" statement with a law of nature, that is, that someone does not take as fundamentally different things the law of gravitation and the expiration of a letter of credit means to assume that this person is almost an idiot. It is in this level that Kelsen finds himself when he intends to make believe that I would have sustained that every rule of the "is" -therefore every law of nature -is at the same time a rule of the "ought", and thus that the law of gravitation would be a social norm. And things were not so differently set forth with respect to the doctrine according to which law is in part rule of the "is" (law of nature), in part rule of the "ought" (EHRLICH, 1916, pp. 844, our translation I wish to add just one comment: I did not write a book of terminology, as the reader who had eventually read Kelsen's criticism might suspect. In general, I deal with terminology only in the measure that is necessary to make myself scientifically understandable. The object of the sociology of law is not terminology, but rather the relation of law to society (EHRLICH, 1916, p. 849 , our translation).
Kelsen's Reply insists that Ehrlich had incurred throughout the book on a combination of perspectives in his analysis of norms. Confusion between the "is" and "ought" would be evidence of the methodological syncretism that characterized his thought, a mix of causal-explanatory considerations and normative considerations.
Kelsen contends against Ehrlich's "[...] absolute inability to understand the methodological problem faced when it comes to the matter of separating sociology of law from the dogmatic science of law" (KELSEN, 1916, p. 853, our translation Machura (2014) . There is no reason to doubt that reading. As Kelsen has shown, at that moment the sociological science of law was more a possibility than a reality. Writing in the early 20 th century, Ehrlich realized that sociology of law needed to be invented. Kelsen himself did not fail to recognize at a certain point of his criticism that Ehrlich's work contributed to pose new questions to the study of law that go beyond the scope of traditional legal science. The sociology of law could even develop further as an academic subject in its own right, but as an auxiliary science to legal science, in a rigid scheme of division of scientific labor.
Indeed, it is known that, in the decades that followed, the fate of sociology of law was the ostracism, amid the triumphant hegemony of the contemporary positivist school of jurisprudence, headed by Kelsen.
Conclusion
The clash between legal dogmatics and sociology of law has already been interpreted, based on the theory of scientific paradigms, as a notable case of paradigmatic dispute that endures for a long period of time without necessarily resulting in a paradigm shift (HAGEN, 1995) . By revisiting the Ehrlich-Kelsen controversy, it was possible to show that the trajectory of sociology of law in the history of legal thought has been marked from the beginning by the clash with legal dogmatics. Ehrlich's Fundamental principles of the sociology of law advanced a call for the development of sociology of law against legal dogmatics, by attacking directly and polemically the prevailing paradigm in the law schools of continental Europe in the early 20 th century.
For Ehrlich, the relationship between sociology of law and legal dogmatics can be seen a dispute between schools of legal thought that approach the same object from incompatible points of view and compete with each other to establish how law should be scientifically studied. In his view, legal dogmatics was a practical and professional form of knowledge about law that cannot be called science, while sociology of the law provided the very possibility of a scientific knowledge about the legal phenomenon.
Ehrlich was not against the existence of legal dogmatics as a form of knowledge, but because he considered it unscientific, he claimed that another way of developing science of law had to be invented. 
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In this scenario, it is to be answered if there is still room for accommodation in a rigid scheme of division of scientific labor, as Kelsen intended. A century after the famous controversy, the perspective of a clash between sociology of law and legal dogmatics, as
Ehrlich defended it, returns with more vitality than ever. 
